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I. INT RODUCT ION

Would you ever enter into a contract when you had no idea what
benefit you would receive? 1 Would you ever enter into a contract without
knowing the terms to which you were obligating yourself? Would you
ever enter into a contract when you would not know the answer to these
questions until after you had bound yourself to the other side? Such
questions may provoke a smile and your own question: “who would ever
do that?” The answer, regrettably, is that criminal defendants do it every
single day.

* Justice Michael P. Donnelly has served on the Supreme Court of Ohio since 2019. Previously he
served for fourteen years in Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas as a trial court judge. Special
thanks to Cheryl Hannan, Rebecca Rabb, Bob Burpee, and Christine Einloth.
1. An agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or
otherwise recognizable at law. Contract, B LACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
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In courtrooms across Ohio, 2 criminal defendants, with the counseled
advice of their attorneys, enter negotiated plea agreements to resolve the
criminal cases brought against them. A fortunate few are fully aware of
the consequences upon entering the agreement—because the judge in
their case is amenable to accepting on the record what is known as an
“agreed sentence,” where the parties are permitted after an arms-length
negotiation to determine the penalty. Another set of defendants will learn
from their attorney in private discussions what the judge is inclined to do
regarding their sentence. Such a discussion will usually take place after
the prosecutor and defense counsel have met with the judge off-the-record
in his or her chambers. These defendants, however, must rely on their
counsels’ word that the judge will not renege on this inducement at their
sentencing hearing. Finally, a significant percentage of criminal
defendants enter plea agreements in which they have no idea what
sentence they might receive or what sentence the prosecutor intends to
advocate for at the sentencing hearing. This group of defendants is most
susceptible to a nefarious phenomenon that occurs all too often in our
criminal system, something I call sentencing by ambush. Before we
explore that term, let’s review some basic criminal procedure.
II. CRIMINAL CASE BASICS
A criminal case begins with an alleged criminal act and a subsequent
investigation. In the majority of criminal cases, the state assesses what it
believes the truth might be and presents charges to a grand jury. If the
grand jury determines that there is probable cause that a crime has been
committed, it will return a true bill, and indict the person suspected of
committing the offense. This person is now known as the defendant. The
defendant will be arraigned, at which time he or she has an opportunity to
enter an initial plea to the charged offenses.
When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case is randomly
assigned to a trial court judge, who is charged with ensuring that the
process of resolution is conducted fairly, meaning in accordance with
applicable rules of evidence and procedure. In every case, from the most
minor infraction to the most serious felony, the judge starts the process by
setting a firm trial date. Trial date certainty is the fuel that drives the entire
criminal justice system. It forces both sides in a criminal dispute to begin
preparing their case, which includes exchanging discovery: information
2. Plea bargains occur on a daily basis across the nation. Because I am writing from my
viewpoint as an Ohio judge, I will focus on what I know about Ohio’s criminal practices and
procedure.
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and factual evidence surrounding the charges. This process generally
takes place privately through correspondence and discussions between the
adversaries outside the presence of the trial court judge, who typically
only gets involved in discovery when a dispute between the parties arises.
At this point, the judge is operating under the assumption that the
state is prepared to prove the truth of its allegations beyond a reasonable
doubt. The defendant has a constitutional right to require the state to prove
its case in a trial, where a fact-finder (jury or judge) determines whether
he or she is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. As the trial date draws near,
and both sides process the information developed through discovery, the
parties are better able to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the case.
The prosecution and defense develop a better grasp of the facts which led
to the charges, the potential defenses, and the potential consequences
associated with a conviction. The parties engage in a cost-benefit analysis
to determine if a plea agreement is a more preferable solution to facing
the unknowns of a trial. Usually, defendants prefer to avoid the
uncertainty of a trial. Approximately 95% of state court criminal cases
and 97% of federal criminal cases do not proceed to trial; 3 instead, they
are disposed of by negotiated plea bargains.
III. A PLEA BARGAIN

IS AN AGREEMENT

A plea bargain is a “negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and
a criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty or no contest to
a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some
concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a
dismissal of the other charges.” 4 Dictionary definitions invariably paint
an incomplete picture. Framing the value of a plea agreement exclusively
in terms of the cost and benefit to the defendant distracts from the
advantages that accrue to the government.
In reality, a negotiated plea agreement is like any other negotiated
agreement. The parties exchange various risks and rights, including
evaluating vulnerabilities, to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
arrangement. 5 The benefits of a plea bargain to a criminal defendant have
3. Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States Legal
Practice, 54 AM. J. C OMP . L. 717, 717 (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 289 (2005)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Plea Bargain, B LACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
5. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) (“ [B]ecause each side may obtain advantages
when a guilty plea is exchanged for sentencing concessions, the agreement is no less voluntary than
any other bargained-for exchange.”).
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been described as “obvious—his [or her] exposure is reduced, the
correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical burdens
of a trial are eliminated.” 6 In addition to a lesser sentence, “[t]he defendant
avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial.” 7 In exchange, the defendant forgoes fundamental constitutional
rights, such as the right to trial by jury, the right to a speedy and public
trial, the right to confront adverse witnesses, the presumption of
innocence, and the right to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8
Negotiated plea agreements offer substantial advantages to the
government and at a much lesser cost. When the government enters a plea
agreement, “it receives immediate and tangible benefits,” most notably a
“promptly imposed punishment without the expenditure of prosecutorial
resources.” 9 Chief Justice Warren Burger famously noted that “[i]f every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the
Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number
of judges and court facilities.” 10 Further, “the defendant’s agreement to
plead to [a] crime tends to ensure some satisfaction of the public’s interest
in the prosecution of crime and confirms that the prosecutor’s charges
have a basis in fact.” 11 In exchange for an efficient, secure, and satisfying
conviction, the government surrenders little more than the opportunity to
punish the defendant to the absolute maximum permitted by law.
A.

How I Became a Student of the Plea Negotiation Process

I first began to consider the mechanics and ethics of the plea
negotiation process 15 years ago during my first term as a judge at the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas (that’s what Ohio calls its trial
courts) in Cleveland, Ohio. Even though I had been exposed to plea
negotiation years earlier as an assistant county prosecutor, I never actually
questioned whether aspects of the plea negotiation process were
inherently unfair and unjustly coercive.

6. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
7. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
8. See State v. Soto, 158 Ohio St.3d 44, 2019-Ohio-4430, 139 N.E.3d 889, ¶ 50 (Donnelly,
J. dissenting): Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157–58 (1968); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501,
503 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
9. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 393 n.3 (1987) (citing Brady, 397 U.S. at 752).
10. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
11. Newton, 480 U.S. at 393 n.3.
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As a new judge, a role that I firmly believe must be a neutral party in
our adversarial justice system, I began to view the plea negotiation process
in an entirely new light. I quickly realized that most of the cases on my
criminal docket would not be resolved at trial. Instead, the bulk of my time
would be spent overseeing plea negotiations between the prosecution and
criminal defense lawyers, conducting plea hearings, and sentencing
individuals who had entered into plea agreements.
The plea negotiation process caught the attention of the popular
podcast Serial, 12 which received many accolades for its investigation of
the criminal justice system in Cuyahoga County during the years 2016–
2017. The reporting exposed the systemic pressure that induces
defendants away from a trial while highlighting the enormous power
wielded by the prosecutor in the plea negotiation process. This power
springs from the prosecutor’s ability to decide which and how many
crimes to charge, obviously dependent on the particular facts of the case.
A prosecutor retains broad discretion and is able to assert serious charges
carrying significant amounts of prison time or to charge the defendant
with lesser criminal offenses—based on the same facts.
To highlight this discretion, consider a case involving a defendant
who steals food from a local supermarket. While in the act, he is spotted
by store security officers and begins to flee with the item in hand. When
officers catch up to him, he forcefully resists apprehension, fortunately
without inflicting serious injuries. The prosecutor could charge
misdemeanor theft along with disorderly conduct or charge the defendant
with a much more serious count of felony robbery. If the case is proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant could face only probation (for a
misdemeanor offense) or many years in prison (for a felony offense)—
based on the same facts, depending on the discretion exercised by the
prosecutor.
B.

A Plea Bargain and Its Pitfalls

Every day, defendants charged with crimes stand next to their
attorneys in a trial court after having reached a tentative plea agreement
with the state. At these hearings, the judge asks the prosecutor to state all
terms of the proposed plea agreement. 13 The judge then carefully explains
all the important rights that the defendant, who remains presumptively
innocent, will be waiving by entering the contractual agreement with the
12.
ENHA].
13.

Season Three, S ERIAL P ODCAST (2018), https://serialpodcast.org/ [https://perma.cc/YV9ZOHIO R. C RIM. P. 11(F).
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state. As the neutral arbiter in our adversarial system, the judge is obliged
to determine whether the defendant is entering the proposed agreement
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily before accepting the plea.
Judges invariably ask the defendant: “Has anyone made any threats,
promises, or representations to you about the sentence you will receive if
you enter this agreement” or something similar to that. If the judge is not
amenable to accepting agreed sentences, the answer to this question will
be “no,” even if in fact an off-the-record representation about sentencing
has been made by the judge. In courtrooms with judges who refuse to
discuss sentencing, however, attorneys are often forced to provide their
clients with an educated estimate about the expected sentence, with the
caveat that nothing is guaranteed. Even though this defies the common
understanding that the defendant is receiving a negotiated benefit,
attorneys tell their clients: “That’s just the way it is.”
This article is an attempt to explain why “the way it is” needs to
change. In my article Truth or Consequences: Making the Case for
Transparency and Reform in the Plea Negotiation Process, 14 I explained
that our criminal justice system has a systemic flaw that contributes to
disparate sentencing from courtroom to courtroom. That flaw is that the
particular sentencing tendencies of the judge in the case are often more
important than the facts and law.
Ohio’s trial court judges are imbued by the Ohio legislature with
enormous power to sentence defendants to prison and decide whether a
proposed plea agreement is acceptable. An inherent weakness in this
system is that this discretion is usually unburdened by governing
principles or standards. Until this issue is fully addressed, prosecutors and
defense lawyers will continue to arduously navigate among the hundreds
of trial court judges in the state, each of whom possesses their own
philosophy concerning their role in the plea negotiation process.
Compounding this systemic weakness is the lack of meaningful review of
sentences by the appellate courts that could provide a valuable check on
the trial court’s authority.
C.

Off-the-Record Discussions

You might think negotiated plea agreements, the most common
method of resolving disputes in Ohio’s criminal justice system, would be
governed by well-established principles, guidelines, and standards that
promote uniformity, proportionality, and meaningful appellate review.
14. Justice Michael P. Donnelly, Commentary, Truth or Consequences: Making the Case for
Transparency and Reform in the Plea Negotiation Process, 17 OHIO S T. J. C RIM. L. 423 (2020).
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They aren’t. The sad reality is that their absence means that trial court
judges throughout the state determine criminal sentences according to
their own proclivities. Some judges are transparent, providing reasonable
expectations to attorneys and their clients. Many others, however, are not;
they categorically refuse to discuss sentencing, considering it a subject
within their unique authority to be exercised at a later time solely by
themselves.
A number of years ago, a group of law student externs from Ohio’s
Attorney General’s Office were observing my courtroom, eager for a
behind-the-scenes look at our criminal justice system. After they watched
me handle several plea and sentencing hearings in the courtroom, I
explained to them a significant difference regarding my approach to plea
agreements from that of most other judges. I explained that, early in my
first term as judge, I had concluded that judges and attorneys should not
negotiate off the record in chambers. I arrived, after much contemplation,
at the belief that no one in the plea negotiation process, including the
judge, should ever say anything off the record that they would not repeat
verbatim in open court on the record. Accordingly, I had made a conscious
decision to hold all plea discussions on the record in open court.
On that particular morning, an experienced public defender was
about to go on record to enter a change of plea for his client. I asked him,
for the benefit of the students, how many times in his career he had
advised his client to say “no” when a judge asked the inevitable question:
“Has anyone made a representation to you about what sentence you would
receive if you enter this plea agreement?” Without hesitation, he answered
that he always advised his clients to say “no,” even when he had provided
them with assurances regarding sentencing that he had received from the
judge in a backroom discussion. I still remember the students’ wide-eyed
reactions—amazed at the candor of our discussion and pleased to be privy
to “inside baseball” concerning an unwritten rule that no one was
supposed to talk about or even acknowledge.
Before the students left, I asked them to consider whether a fair
system of criminal justice would expect defendants to enter into a
negotiated plea agreement without knowing what benefit they were
receiving as part of the plea bargain. I told them one of the biggest threats
to public confidence in the criminal justice system stemmed from off-therecord sentencing representations, whether from a judge in chambers or a
defense attorney’s informed speculation.
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IV. SENT ENCING BY AMBUSH
A.

State v. Davis

The concept of sentencing by ambush first became apparent to me
while reviewing an appellate case in 2018—State v. Davis. 15 Davis had
been indicted on numerous counts of drug trafficking. 16 The prosecutor
and Davis’s attorney had negotiated a proposed plea agreement which
would provide each side with a global resolution of all six cases against
Davis. 17 The state had agreed to dismiss several charges, ostensibly
significantly reducing the number of years that Davis would spend in
prison.
At the first plea hearing, the trial court explained that it had a policy
against discussing sentencing related to plea agreements. 18 Even after the
dismissal of many counts, a trial court retains enormous discretion, either
to show leniency (with a minimum sentence of 3 years) or severity (with
a maximum sentence of 39 years)—irrespective of what the parties had
agreed to. 19 Davis was told this on the record and the matter was
continued, to give him time to consider the agreement. 20 At the next plea
hearing, Davis stood before the court and was asked whether he was aware
of all the rights he was giving up if he chose to enter the plea agreement. 21
He then engaged in the following customary, time-worn plea colloquy.
The Court: All right. Now, two more questions, then we can take your
plea. Have any threats been made to you to change your plea?
Defendant: No, your Honor.
The Court: Have there been any promises made to you to get you to
change your plea?
Defendant: No, your Honor. 22

15. State v. Davis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104574, 2018-Ohio-1147.
16. Id. at ¶ 3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. This isn’t in the court’s written decision, but is required pursuant to OHIO R. C RIM. P.
11(C)(2)(c).
22. Davis, 2018-Ohio-1147, ¶ 6.
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With that, the court accepted the plea and, without ordering a presentence report, proceeded immediately to sentencing. 23 Davis, when
provided an opportunity to speak, expressed his remorse, and stated that
he accepted responsibility and was prepared to accept the consequences
for his criminal acts. 24 The trial court sentenced Davis to 22 years in
prison. 25 Upon hearing his fate, Davis asked to withdraw his plea. 26 He
emphatically stated that his attorney had told him that he would not get
more than three years if he chose to enter the plea agreement. 27 Davis’s
attorney conceded that he had told Davis that the prosecutors had
presented the deal to him as carrying a “potential” minimum sentence of
three years; he insisted that he had not made any promises to Davis. 28
Because Davis had answered the fateful question about promises in the
negative, the trial court refused to allow him to withdraw his plea. 29
I explained the details of this case many times on the campaign trail
in 2018. It is a perfect example of how things can go awry in a
nontransparent justice system. I have no sympathy or pity regarding the
actions that led to Davis being in front of a trial court. Perhaps there was
no better way to protect the public from him than with the lengthy prison
sentence he received. Even so, he deserved better treatment, including fair
disclosure and transparency. He did not deserve to be ambushed. Over the
many occasions I discussed this case with the public, not one person on
the campaign trail ever disagreed with me about that.
B.

State v. Gwynne 30

In November 2018, I was fortunate to win a seat on the Supreme
Court of Ohio. Serendipitously, among the first cases I reviewed was one
involving sentencing by ambush.
A 55-year-old woman named Susan Gwynne had been charged with
numerous felony property crimes in Delaware County. 31 She apparently
had dressed in scrubs to avoid detection while she entered various nursing

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at ¶ 7–8.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Id.
State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761,141 N.E.3d 169.
Id. at ¶ 4.
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home facilities for the purpose of stealing property from residents. 32 Her
criminal activity took place over eight years. 33 The police identified 46
victims from at least 12 separate facilities. 34
Defense counsel negotiated a plea agreement in which Gwynne
agreed to plead to numerous felony and misdemeanor counts, including
burglary and theft. 35 According to her attorney, he attempted to negotiate
an agreed sentence of three to four years, but the state was seeking a
sentence in the range of 10 to 15 years. 36 At the change of plea hearing,
the trial court thoroughly discussed the multitude of outcomes that
Gwynne faced, from lenient to severe, based on the number of counts and
the judge’s discretion. 37 The trial court stated on several occasions “if I []
send you to prison,” implying that a community-controlled sanction (i.e.,
probation) was a possible outcome. 38 At the plea hearing, the state was
silent regarding its position on Gwynne’s sentence. 39
Once the plea had been accepted, the court ordered a pre-sentence
report and set a date for a sentencing hearing. 40 The state submitted a
memorandum that “inexplicably recommended two wildly divergent
sentences: [either] a 42-year sentence (‘the minimum prison term on each
felony conviction, all served consecutive[ly] to each other’) or two years
(. . . ‘the minimum sentences on each felony, to be served
concurrently’).” 41 Defense counsel advocated for community control or,
if a prison term was imposed, that the sentences be imposed
concurrently. 42 The defense also indicated that Gwynne would pay
restitution. 43
Gwynne arrived at her sentencing hearing not knowing whether she
would receive probation and be released that day or whether she would
receive a sentence so lengthy that she was likely to die in prison. 44 The

32. Id. at ¶ 3. See State v. Gwynne, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 16 CAA 12 0056, 2017-Ohio-7570,
at ¶ 2, rev’d, 2019-Ohio-4761, 158 Ohio St. 3d 279, 141 N.E.3d 169.
33. State v. Gwynne, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 3.
34. Id.
35. Id. at ¶ 5.
36. Id. at ¶ 80 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
37. Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279, 2019-Ohio-4761, 141 N.E.3d
169.
38. Gwynne, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 78 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at ¶ 9.
40. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 37, at 5.
41. Gwynne, 2019-Ohio-4761, ¶ 80 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
42. Id.
43. Id. at ¶ 5.
44. Id. at ¶ 81 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
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trial court imposed a 65-year sentence—23 years more than the
prosecution had sought; this sentence is longer than many murderers and
rapists receive. 45 In a deeply divided decision, our court could not even
agree on whether Ohio’s appellate courts are empowered to review
Gwynne’s sentence. 46 Ultimately, we remanded the case to the appellate
court for it to consider an issue that had not been appealed to us. 47 Though
we afforded a glimmer of relief to Gwynne, we provided little if any
guidance to the lower courts.
This case caused me to ponder when the dynamics of our criminal
justice system began to allow a resolution like this one. When did it
become acceptable (in a supposedly fair and just legal system) for a
defendant, who enters into a plea agreement with a reasonable expectation
of receiving some kind of benefit in return for pleading guilty, to receive
no indication as to what position the state will take at sentencing? When
did it become acceptable for a judge to tell a defendant, I might give you
probation (meaning: no time in prison), and then sentence her to 65 years
in prison? Ohio’s laws and Rules of Criminal Procedure do not allow trial
by ambush. So why do we allow it at sentencing? Is it any wonder that
large segments of our society describe our criminal justice system as
broken?
V. ENDING SENT ENCING BY AMBUSH
When I first began my legal career (nearly 30 years ago), the Ohio
Rules of Criminal Procedure did not permit open discovery in criminal
cases. Thus, as a young assistant prosecutor, I was not required to provide
copies of vital pieces of information for defense counsel to view with their
own eyes. I had access to police reports, witness statements, and photos,
among other evidence, but I was not required to release any of it to the
defendant. Instead, I could tell defense counsel about the information I
believed they were entitled to. Counsel would take copious notes, forced
to trust that I was providing them with all the information they needed to
effectively represent their client. This remained the manner of conducting
discovery when I became a trial court judge in 2005. In my early years as
a new judge, it was very common to hear exasperated defense counsel
claim that they were learning information for the first time on the eve,
sometimes in the midst, of a trial. Finally, albeit belatedly, as a response
45.
46.
47.

Id. at ¶¶ 5, 81 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶ 87 (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
Id. at ¶¶ 18–20.
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to pressure from the defense bar and intense media coverage, the shackles
that permitted trial by ambush were eradicated with the implementation
of open discovery in 2010. 48
Now is the time to address another form of ambush that continues to
this day. Not long after I first identified the problem of sentencing by
ambush in Truth or Consequences, I discussed the issue with two
experienced attorneys, one from the prosecutor’s office and the other from
the defense bar. Both individuals recognized sentencing by ambush as a
chronic problem that will persist as long as Ohio trial court judges retain
as much discretion as they have. According to Neal B. Kauder and Brian
J. Ostrom, Ohio judges have nearly unfettered discretion in sentencing,
with few if any guardrails to restrain judicial power or provide meaningful
review of such discretion. 49
The best solution to obviate the unfairness of sentencing by ambush
would be for the General Assembly to enact a complete data driven
overhaul of our present antiquated statutory scheme along with reasonable
sentencing guidelines and ranges to rein in judicial discretion. This would
prevent defendants entering plea agreements from facing vastly different
outcomes based on the judge to whom they are randomly, but not
inconsequentially, assigned. Recall that Davis was faced with a
sentencing range of 3 to 39 years (and received a 22-year sentence) and
that Gwynne was faced with a sentencing range of probation and the 65year sentence she received. Also recall that neither of them expected to be
sentenced as severely as they ultimately were.
Additionally, a serious discussion about the role of judges in the plea
negotiation process is long overdue. We should consider whether rules
should be developed to guide the exercise of this enormous power retained
by our judges to either accept or reject proposed plea agreements. A judge
is in the best position to assess whether the terms of the agreement are
based on an arm’s length negotiation. As neutral participants, judges are
also in the best position to assess whether the defendant is entering the
plea agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. But a defendant
cannot knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily submit to a sentence
unless he or she has a reasonable idea about what the sentence will be.
We also need to question why some judges in our system accept
agreed sentences and others do not. The prosecutor and defense counsel,
generally speaking, are in the best position to assess the strengths and
48. See OHIO R. C RIM. P. 16 staff notes (amending the rule in 2010 to, among other things,
accelerate “ the timing of the exchange of materials”).
49. NEAL B. KAUDER & B RIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’ L C TR. F OR S TATE C OURTS, S TATE
S ENTENCING GUIDELINES: P ROFILES AND C ONTINUUM 20 (2008).
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weaknesses of their case, including the procedural hurdles and
aggravating or mitigating factors involved. If, in the proper exercise of
their roles, these adversaries arrive at an agreed-upon penalty, which the
judge later deems unacceptable, principles of transparency and fairness
dictate that the judge state on the record the reasons why he or she is
rejecting the proposed agreement. The proffered explanations would
allow appellate courts to provide meaningful review to how the trial court
exercised its discretion in the sentencing process.
Trial courts should also operate as a check on the discretionary power
of the prosecutor to ensure that plea agreements are negotiated at arm’s
length and to prevent agreements that are unduly punitive or lenient. In
cases where such an appearance may exist, a trial court should require the
prosecutor and defense counsel to state on the record the rationale
supporting the plea agreement. The concomitant enhanced transparency
will increase public confidence that the parties and the court are properly
evaluating cases to reach resolutions that are legitimate, fact-based, and
consistently reasonable.
As previously noted, years ago I asked a group of law students to
consider whether a fair system of criminal justice should expect
defendants to enter into a negotiated plea agreement without knowing
what benefit they were receiving as part of the plea bargain. It should be
clear that I believe the answer to this question must be a resounding “no.”
To ensure a fair playing field, trial courts should not accept a plea
agreement until they have made an inquiry on the record as to what
position the state intends to advocate at a future sentencing hearing.
Finally, Ohio should continue its efforts to establish once and for all
a statewide sentencing database that would collect relevant data about
every negotiated plea agreement and every criminal sentence issued in the
state. This reform would provide decision-makers (judges, prosecutors,
defense counsel, and legislators) with information that is essential to
ensure that better decisions are made regarding the most serious issue of
incarcerating individuals. As a result of having such information, criminal
sentences will also be more uniform and proportional to the conduct at
issue and less subject to implicit bias, and appellate courts will be in a
better position to correct unfair or excessive sentences.
A dozen or so years ago, our state adopted open discovery to
eliminate the unfair practice of trial by ambush. Today the time is ripe to
eradicate sentencing by ambush.
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